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1. Introduction
There is a widespread interest in coordination games with multiple
Pareto-ranked equilibria, since these games have many equilibria that are bad
for all concerned, but still are diﬃcult to rule out by standard notions of
rationality. The coordination game is of particular importance for macroec-
onomists, who believe that an economy may be become mired in a low-output
equilibrium, see e.g. Bryant [2], Cooper [4], and Cooper and John [6]. Indeed,
while all agents in the economy understand that the outcome is ineﬃcient,
each agent, acting independently, is powerless to coordinate the activities of
other agents to reach a Pareto-preferred equilibrium. So, from this perspec-
tive, a depression in aggregate economic activity arises when the economy
falls into the trap of a low activity level Nash equilibrium.
Consider a 2 2 coordination game between two players. The payoﬀ
matrix is given in Figure 1. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this
simultaneous move game, the strategy proﬁles ða; aÞ and ðb; bÞ, as well as a
mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player selects the action a with
probability 13. These are Nash equilibria because each player is acting opti-
mally given the choice of the other. The equilibria of this coordination game
are strict Nash equilibria. Consequently, the strategy proﬁle ðb; bÞ also sat-
isﬁes the conditions imposed by the most reﬁned equilibrium notions such as
strategic stability in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens [12]. The multiplicity
of equilibria, and thus the possibility of a Pareto-inferior equilibrium, derives
from players’ inability to coordinate their choices in this strategic envi-
ronment. As a consequence, realized equilibrium outcomes that are
Pareto-suboptimal relative to other equilibria are often termed coordination
failures.
One conclusion of a fair amount of experimental evidence is that coor-
dination problems are not a pure theoretical curiosity. In particular, coor-
dination failures are routinely observed in experimental games, see e.g.
Cooper et al. [5], and Ochs [13].
Complementary to the accumulation of evidence on coordination games
has been the development of theories concerning equilibrium selection in these
games. Harsanyi and Selten [9] have proposed the risk dominance principle.
This principle models that the play of certain equilibrium strategies is riskier
than the play of others given the underlying strategic uncertainty of a game.
Carlsson and van Damme [3] have provided an argument for selection of an
equilibrium in a coordination game. Their idea is to explore the equilibria of a
Fig. 1. A 2 2 coordination game
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nearby game of incomplete information. The equilibrium for the coordination
game is then the limit of the equilibrium for the nearby game as the amount of
incomplete information goes to zero. They ﬁnd that in the limit it is the risk-
dominant equilibrium that is selected. Another approach to equilibrium
selection involves exploring the dynamics of coordination games. This
approach requires the speciﬁcation of a dynamic process describing the play of
agents involved in such a game, see e.g. Kandori et al. [11]. Another part of the
literature has looked for possible remedies to coordination problems like
preplay communication or cheap talk (see Farrel [7], [8] and Rabin [15] ).
This paper considers a novel and simple way to resolve coordination
problems, which consists of the combination of fuzzy play and the intro-
duction of a matching device. By fuzzy play we mean that each player does
not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty
subset of his strategy set that he submits to a matching device. The matching
device is a very simple one. It randomly selects a match if possible, and it
selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each
player otherwise. That is, it does not impose that the best alternatives are
matched. We focus on pure n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked
Nash equilibria.
For the 2 2 coordination game represented in Figure 1, players now
have to choose between sending to the matching device either only the action
a, or only the action b, or both actions a and b. The matching device selects a
match if possible, it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy
set sent by each player otherwise. That is, if both players send both actions a
and b to the device, then the pair ða; aÞ is selected with probability p 2 ð0; 1Þ
and the pair ðb; bÞ is selected with probability 1 p. If one player sends only
action a, while the other player sends both actions a and b, then the device
selects the pair ða; aÞ with probability one; and so on. Payoﬀs of this new
game are given in Figure 2 with x ¼ 1þ p.
Using the concepts of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand
perfect rationalizability, we show that players coordinate directly on the best
match possible. They do not use the option of fuzzy play, but submit a single
strategy to the matching device. This strategy is the one corresponding to the
Pareto optimal outcome.
Fig. 2. Fuzzy play in the 2 2 coordination
game
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The concept of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability reverts to the
iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies for the class of two-
player normal-form games. Let us apply this well-known concept to our
example. Obviously, the strategy which consists of sending only the action b
to the device is weakly dominated by the strategy where both actions a and b
are sent. Indeed, in that case the worst outcome is ðb; bÞ; which is the best one
can hope for when submitting only action b: Therefore, at the ﬁrst round of
the iterative procedure we eliminate the strategy which consists of sending
only the action b. At the second round, the strategy where both actions are
sent is now weakly dominated by the strategy which consists of sending only
the action a. Indeed, given that the opponent submits either action a or both
actions a and b; sending action a results for sure in the best possible outcome,
ða; aÞ: So, the unique trembling-hand perfect rationalizable solution is the one
where both players choose to send only the Pareto-optimal action a.
2. Fuzzy play and the matching device
We consider an n-player pure coordination game denoted by
G ¼ N ; fAigi2N ; fuigi2N
 
; where N ¼ f1; . . . ; ng is the set of players, Ai is the
ﬁnite set of actions or pure strategies of player i, and ui is player i’s payoﬀ
function. A game is a coordination game if the players have the same numberm
of strategies, which are indexed so that it is always a strict Nash equilibrium for
both players to play strategies having the same index. Without loss of gener-
ality, we may assume that the sets of pure strategies of all players coincide,
A1 ¼    ¼ An; which makes it meaningful to take intersections of such sets.
A pure coordination game is a coordination game for which the payoﬀs oﬀ
the diagonal are zero. In the game G we have that strict Nash equilibria are on
the diagonal, and outside the diagonal the payoﬀs are zero for both players.
Finally, we impose that the strict Nash equilibria are Pareto ranked, without
loss of generality decreasing in the index of the strategy. Summarizing,
uiða11; . . . ; an1Þ >    > uiða1m; . . . ; anmÞ > 0; i 2 N ;
uiða1k1 ; . . . ; anknÞ ¼ 0; ki
0 6¼ ki00 for some i0; i00 2 N :
We introduce both fuzzy play and a matching device. By fuzzy play we mean
that a player does not necessarily restrict himself to play a single pure strategy
aik; but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set A
i that he
submits to the matching device. He thereby rules out that strategies outside
the submitted subset are played. As a consequence, the set of strategies of
each player becomes
Si ¼ si; 6¼ si  Ai , i 2 N ,
and the set of pure strategy proﬁles is S ¼Qi2N Si. The matching device is
assumed to operate as follows. It randomly selects a match if possible, and it
selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each
player otherwise. That is, the matching device does not impose that the best
alternatives are matched.
Let pðaikÞ denote the prior probability that the matching device selects the
strategy aik 2 Ai, i 2 N . It is assumed that pðaikÞ > 0 for all k,
P
aik2Ai pða
i
kÞ ¼ 1,
and pða1kÞ ¼    ¼ pðankÞ ¼ pk; k ¼ 1; :::;m.
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Suppose player i submits the set of actions si 2 Si to the matching device.
Two cases have to be distinguished. Either the players’ action sets have one or
more actions in common, or they have nothing in common. That is, either
there is k such that for all i 2 N ; aik 2 si; or there is no k such that for all i 2 N ;
aik 2 si; so \i2Nsi ¼ ;: If \i2Nsi ¼ ;; then aik 2 si is chosen with probability
pkP
ail2si pl
; i 2 N :
If \i2Nsi 6¼ ; and ak 2 \i2Nsi, then ak is chosen with probability
pkP
al2\i2N si pl
:
The way the matching device selects strategies is assumed to be common
knowledge among all players.
We can express the payoﬀs of the induced game as follows:
Uiðs1; . . . ; snÞ ¼
0 if \i2N si ¼ ;,P
ak2\i2N si
pk uiða1k ;...;ankÞP
ak2\i2N si
pk
otherwise.
8
<
:
We denote the induced game by G ¼ N ; fSigi2N ; fUigi2N
 
. The concepts we
will use to analyze G are perfect Nash equilibrium and trembling–hand per-
fect rationalizability.
3. Perfect Nash equilibrium
Three equivalent deﬁnitions of perfect Nash equilibrium have been proposed
in the literature. One of them has been introduced by Selten [16] and is the
following. A perfect Nash equilibrium is a limit point of a sequence of
completely mixed strategy proﬁles with the property that it is a best reply
against every element in the sequence. As general notation, we denote by
D Xð Þ the set of all Borel probability measures on X : For ﬁnite X ; we denote
by D0ðX Þ the set of all Borel probability measures giving positive probability
to each member of X . Given ci 2 DðSiÞ, we denote by ciðsiÞ the probability
that ci assigns to the subset of pure strategies si: Perfect Nash equilibrium for
the game G is deﬁned formally as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. A perfect Nash equilibrium of the game G is a mixed strategy
proﬁle c 2Qi2N D Sið Þ with the property that there exists a sequence cnð Þ1n¼0 of
completely mixed strategy proﬁles that converges to c such that for each player i
the strategy ci is a best response to cin for all values of n.
We say that a player’s strategy is weakly dominated if the player has
another strategy at least as good no matter what the other players do and
better for at least some strategy proﬁle of the other players. To characterize
the perfect Nash equilibria of the game G; the following two lemmas are very
useful.
Lemma 1. If a strategy proﬁle is a perfect Nash equilibrium of G; then the
strategy of neither player is weakly dominated.
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Lemma 2. The game G possesses at least one trembling hand perfect equilib-
rium.
The proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 can be found in van Damme
[p.49,17] and in Selten [p.48,16] , respectively. Before characterizing the per-
fect Nash equilibria, we ﬁrst examine the set of all Nash equilibria of the game
G.
Theorem 1. The strategy proﬁle s ¼ ðs1; . . . ; snÞ 2 S is a pure Nash equilibrium
of G if and only if for all i 2 N ; uiða1k ; . . . ; ank Þ  UiðsÞ; where
k ¼ minfk j ak 2 \j2Nnfigsjg and uiðak Þ ¼ 0 if \j2Nnfigsj ¼ ;:
Proof: Consider a strategy proﬁle s 2 S: Player i does not deviate if and only
if for all ak 2 \j2Nnfigsj it holds that uiða1k ; . . . ; ankÞ  UiðsÞ: This observation
leads immediately to the result. j
Theorem 1 claims that a strategy proﬁle is a pure Nash equilibrium in the
game G if and only if no player would obtain a higher payoﬀ by submitting
the lowest indexed action on which all opponents agree. Nash equilibria are
such that \i2Nsi ¼ akf g; k ¼ 1; :::;m; or \i2Nsi ¼ ;:
From Theorem 1 we derive that the Nash equilibria in symmetric pure
strategies of the game G coincide with the Nash equilibria in pure strategies of
the game G. Symmetry implies s1 ¼    ¼ sn: Next, from our characterization
of pure strategy Nash equilibria of G one may immediately infer that si; i 2 N ;
is a singleton. Moreover, each strategy combination ðfa1kg; . . . ; fankgÞ is a
Nash equilibrium of G: Obviously, each strategy combination ða1k ; . . . ; ankÞ is a
Nash equilibrium of G. We have shown the following result.
Corollary 1. The symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game G are
ðfakg; . . . ; fakgÞ; k ¼ 1; ::;m, and coincide with the pure strategy Nash equilibria
of the game G; given by ðak; . . . ; akÞ; k ¼ 1; ::;m.
We turn next to the characterization of perfect Nash equilibria.
Theorem 2. If the strategy proﬁle ðs1; . . . ; snÞ is a perfect Nash equilibrium of
G; then \i2Nsi ¼ fa1g:
Proof: Consider any si such that ai1 =2 si:We show that si is weakly dominated
by si [ fai1g. First, against si such that a1 2 \j2Nnfigsj; we have
Uiðsi [ fai1g; siÞ ¼
X
ak2\j2N sj
pk
p1 þ
P
al2\j2N sj pl
 uiða1k ; . . . ; ankÞ
þ p1
p1 þ
P
al2\j2N sj pl
 uiða11; . . . ; an1Þ
>
X
ak2\j2N sj
pkP
al2\j2N sj pl
 uiða1k ; . . . ; ankÞ
¼ Uiðsi; siÞ:
Second, against si such that a1 =2 \j2Nnfig sj; we have
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Uiðsi [ fai1g; siÞ ¼ Uiðsi; siÞ ¼
X
ak2\j2N sj
pkP
al2\j2N sj pl
 uiða1k ; . . . ; ankÞ.
Using Lemma 1 and knowing that every strategy si which does not contain ai1
is weakly dominated by si [ fai1g, it follows that no perfect Nash equilibrium
puts positive weight on such a strategy si. Using our characterization of Nash
equilibria in Theorem 1, it follows that the strategy ðs1; . . . ; snÞ 2 S is a perfect
Nash equilibrium only if \i2Nsi ¼ fa1g: j
Theorem 2 claims that a strategy proﬁle can only be a perfect Nash
equilibrium of the game G if the intersection of the strategy sets submitted
contains a unique element, action a1: The proof of Theorem 2 is rather
straightforward. The main step is the proof that any strategy si which does
not contain ai1 is weakly dominated by s
i [ fai1g: Indeed, against a pure
strategy combination of the opponents that does not have ai1 in its inter-
section, this does not lead to a change in payoﬀ. Otherwise, there is a
strictly positive probability that the Pareto optimal outcome is selected by
the matching device, which implies an increase in the expected payoﬀ. Next,
given that each player includes ai1 in its strategy, a selection of any other
action by the matching device should be avoided, as this leads to a strictly
lower payoﬀ. When one restricts attention to symmetric equilibria, this
implies that each player should only submit action a1 to the matching
device.
Corollary 2. The unique symmetric perfect Nash equilibrium of G is
ðfa11g; . . . ; fan1gÞ.
4. Trembling-hand perfect rationalizability
In the same way as rationalizability (Bernheim [1], Pearce [14]) is related to
Nash equilibrium, the concept of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability
due to Herings and Vannetelbosch [10] is related to perfect Nash equi-
librium. Instead of using best responses as in rationalizability, the players
are required to use cautious best responses in trembling-hand perfect
rationalizability.
Another motivation which leads to the trembling-hand perfect rational-
izability concept is obtained by carrying the logic behind cautious rational-
izability (due to Pearce [14]) one step further. This implies that one wants to
consider a solution concept where players eliminate responses that are not
cautious in each round. All pure strategies that haven’t been deleted yet are
considered as possible by the players, and therefore they do not use conjec-
tures that put probability zero on some of these strategies. Trembling-hand
perfect rationalizability (THPR) is deﬁned by the following iterative
procedure.
Deﬁnition 2. Let T0 ¼
Q
i2N DðSiÞ: For k  1; Tk ¼
Q
i2N T
i
k is inductively
deﬁned as follows: ci belongs to T ik if c
i 2 T ik1 and there is ci 2 intðchðTik1ÞÞ
such that ci is a best response against ci within T ik1: The set T1 ¼ limk!1 Tk is
the set of trembling-hand perfect rationalizable strategy proﬁles of the game G.
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At each step of the iteration, a strategy ci of player i has to be a best
response against some conjecture ci 2 intðchðTik1ÞÞ; the relative interior of
the convex hull of the set Tik1: Such a conjecture is called a cautious
conjecture. It follows that at each step of the iteration at least all weakly
dominated strategies are deleted. The set of trembling-hand perfect ratio-
nalizable strategy proﬁles is shown to be non-empty in Herings and
Vannetelbosch [10].
Theorem 3. The set of trembling-hand perfect rationalizable strategy proﬁles of
the game G is non-empty.
Lemma 3 claims that any strategy which excludes the action ai1 is never a
cautious best response, and can therefore not belong to T i1. In other words, it
is never a best response for player i to send a subset of actions to the matching
device which does not contain the Pareto one, ai1. Moreover, one can show
that submitting any strategy to the matching device that contains the Pareto
action ai1 is individually rational.
Lemma 3. It holds that si 2 T i1 if and only if ai1 2 si.
Proof: We show ﬁrst that si =2 T i1 if ai1 =2 si. Consider any si such that ai1 =2 si. It
follows as in the proof of Theorem 2 that si is weakly dominated by si [ fai1g.
We show next that si 2 T i1 if ai1 2 si. We observe ﬁrst that if si is the unique
best response against a conjecture ci (possibly degenerate), then it is also the
unique best response against some cautious conjecture. More precisely, take
any si 2 Si. If there exists ci such that (i) ci 2 DðSiÞ and (ii) for all si 2 Si,
si 6¼ si, Uiðsi; ciÞ > Uiðsi; ciÞ, then, using a continuity argument, it follows
that there exists bci such that (iii) bci 2 D0ðSiÞ and (iv) for all si 2 Si, si 6¼ si,
Uiðsi;bciÞ > Uiðsi;bciÞ.
Consider any si such that ai1 2 si: For j 6¼ i; let cj be a non-degenerate
probability distribution on fajkg; for aik 2 si; and faj1; ajkg; for aik =2 si: When
all players j play according to cj; then there is only positive probability on
intersections \j2Nnfigsj of the form ;; ak for aik 2 si; or fa1; akg for ak =2 si:
Notice that the play of si results in the highest payoﬀ possible, irrespective
of the \j2Nnfigsj that results from the play of i’s opponents. The play of
any proper subset of si results in a strictly lower payoﬀ when matched
against fakg for some ak 2 si not in the proper subset. The play of a set of
actions that contains an action ak not in si results in a strictly lower payoﬀ
when matched against fa1; akg: It follows that si is the unique best
response against the conjecture ci; and by the argument given above, it is
the unique best response against some cautious conjecture. It follows that
si 2 T i1: j
The proof of Lemma 3 consists of two steps. As in the proof of Theorem 2
it is easy to show that any strategy si which does not contain ai1 is weakly
dominated by si [ fai1g: To show the reverse, for each si containing ai1; we
construct a cautious conjecture against which si is the best response.
We can use Lemma 3 to show the following main result.
Theorem 4. It holds that T i2 ¼ T i1 ¼ ffai1gg; i 2 N :
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Proof: From Lemma 3 we know that any sj 2 T j1 contains the action aj1:
Then, irrespective of the choice of sj 2 T j1 ; j 2 N n fig; the play of si ¼ fai1g
gives to player i a utility Uiðfai1g; siÞ ¼ uiða11; :::; an1Þ. Consider any si 2 T i1
such that si 6¼ fai1g. Obviously, Uiðsi; siÞ  uiða11; :::; an1Þ; for all
si 2Qj2Nnfig T j1 : If sj ¼ si; j 2 N n fig; we have that \j2Nnfigsj  a1; akf g
for some k 6¼ 1. Given that the matching device selects ak with positive
probability, we have Uiðsi; siÞ < uiða11; :::; an1Þ: It follows that for any
conjecture ci 2 intðchðTi1 ÞÞ; Uiðsi; ciÞ < uiða11; :::; an1Þ: We have shown
that T i2 ¼ ffai1gg: It follows immediately from Theorem 3 that
T i1 ¼ ffai1gg: j
Theorem 4 states that according to the concept of trembling-hand perfect
rationalizability, all players submit a strategy that consists of a single action,
a1: The mere availability of a matching device is suﬃcient to coordinate
directly on the Pareto optimal outcome. The proof of Theorem 4 is relatively
straightforward. After a ﬁrst round of elimination of strategies that are not
cautious best responses (Lemma 3), all strategies not containing a1 are
eliminated and all strategies containing a1 survive. Against any cautious
conjecture on all strategies that involve a1; it is clear that the strategy con-
sisting of the singleton action a1 is the unique best response, and Theorem 4
follows.
To illustrate our results we consider the 3 3 pure coordination game
depicted in Figure 3. Once we introduce fuzzy play and the simple matching
device, we obtain a new game whose matrix payoﬀs are given by Figure 4
where 3 > x > 2, 2 > y > 1, 3 > z > 1, 3 > w > 1 and w > y. Obviously, the
strategies of player i that do not include the action a1 are weakly dominated,
and hence do not belong to T i1. Indeed, the strategies fa2g, fa3g, fa2; a3g are
weakly dominated (and are never cautious best responses) by the strategies
fa1; a2g, fa1; a3g, fa1; a2; a3g. At the ﬁrst round we eliminate all the strategies
that do not include the action a1 . At the second round, both players know
that their opponent will never use such strategies. Since both players are
cautious, their conjectures have to give positive weight to fa1g, fa1; a2g,
fa1; a3g and fa1; a2; a3g of their opponent. As a consequence each player has a
Fig. 3. A 3 3 coordination game
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unique cautious best response, which is the strategy fa1g. Indeed, this strategy
will guarantee a payoﬀ of 3 while any other strategy gives a payoﬀ of at most
3 and a payoﬀ strictly less than 3 against some strategies within the support of
the conjecture. So, each player has a unique trembling-hand perfect ratio-
nalizable strategy, which consists of sending only the action a1 to the device
and which allows the players to coordinate perfectly on the Pareto-optimal
outcome.
5. Extensions
The extension of a normal-form game by fuzzy play and a matching device is
possible for a far more general class of games than the pure coordination
games studied in this paper. A fully general analysis is beyond the scope of the
current paper. We will limit ourselves here to a few examples that highlight
some interesting features.
First of all, one may want to consider games where diﬀerent players have a
diﬀerent number of pure strategies. As long as such games remain pure
coordination games, i.e., it is possible to renumber the strategies such that the
outcomes on the diagonal are Pareto ranked, and all other outcomes lead to a
payoﬀ of zero, our results remain valid.
Secondly, one may want to consider games where oﬀ-diagonal elements
are not set to zero. If the payoﬀ of a non-diagonal outcome is ci for player i;
where ci is any number strictly less than uiða1m; . . . ; anmÞ; the game remains
essentially a pure coordination game, and all our results remain valid.
Fig. 4. Fuzzy play in the 3 3 coordination game
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In general, however, non-diagonal elements matter. For instance, suppose
that in a 3-player game with two pure actions for each player, the non-
diagonal payoﬀs corresponding to action 1 are negative for all players,
whereas those corresponding to action 2 are zero. When player 3 conjectures
that with high probability player 1 submits the strategy a1 and player 2
submits the strategy a2; the probability is high that no match is produced, and
the unique best response for player 3 is to play the safe strategy consisting of
action a2 only. A similar reasoning rationalizes the submission of action a2
for all players. In this case, the extension of the coordination game with fuzzy
play and a matching device does not rule out more strategies than usual when
the concept of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability is used. When the non-
diagonal payoﬀs corresponding to action a1 are suﬃciently negative, sub-
mission of the strategy a2 can be sustained as a perfect Nash equilibrium in
the induced game. This should not come as a surprise. It is well-known that
Pareto dominance and risk dominance may point in diﬀerent directions, see
Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
In a game, it is generally possible to have Pareto improving non-Nash
equilibrium outcomes. Consider the following game.
The game of Figure 5 has a unique Nash equilibrium, where both players
choose action b: Indeed, for player 2 the choice of b dominates the choice of
a; and the best response of player 1 against action b is choosing action b as
well. Notice that apart from the payoﬀ of 3 for player 2 at the outcome ða; bÞ;
the payoﬀs correspond to a pure coordination game.
Fig. 5. A 2 2 game with a unique, ineﬃcient, Nash
equilibrium
Fig. 6. Fuzzy play in the 2 2 coordina-
tion game
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After the introduction of fuzzy play and the matching device, the induced
game is represented in Figure 6, where x equals 1þ p; and p is the probability
that the matching device selects outcome ða; aÞ when both players submit the
strategy fa; bg:
Application of the solution concept of trembing-hand perfect rationaliz-
ability leads to the following results. For player 1, strategy fbg is weakly
dominated by strategy fa; bg: It is not hard to ﬁnd cautious conjectures
against which fag and fa; bg are best responses. It follows that
T 11 ¼ ffag; fa; bgg: All strategies of player 2 are a best response against some
cautious conjecture, so T 21 ¼ ffag; fbg; fa; bgg: After elimination of strategyfbg of player 1, player 2’s strategy fa; bg is weakly dominated by strategy
fag; and can therefore not be a cautious best response. It follows easily that
T 22 ¼ ffag; fbgg: Since T 21 ¼ T 20 ; we ﬁnd that T 12 ¼ T 11 : As soon as player 1
puts cautious conjectures on strategies with a single action of player 2, her
strategy fag becomes weakly dominated by fa; bg; so T 13 ¼ ffa; bgg: Since
T 12 ¼ T 11 ; it follows that T 23 ¼ T 22 : Finally, when player 2 conjectures player 1
to play fa; bg; his unique best response is strategy fag: As a conclusion, we
ﬁnd that T 11 ¼ ffa; bgg and T 21 ¼ fag:
It is not possible to obtain a non-equilibrium outcome of the original
normal-form game as the unique outcome without using the matching device
in the induced game, neither by using the concept of trembling-hand perfect
rationalizability, nor by using perfect Nash equilibrium. The actual use of the
matching device is therefore essential to sustain a non-equilibrium outcome of
the original game. For perfect Nash equilibrium this is clear, since by deﬁ-
nition there is a player that would like to deviate from any non-equilibrium
outcome. Against a conjecture that puts probability 1 on the non-equilibrium
outcome, the deviating player has a best response diﬀering from her action in
the non-equilibrium outcome, showing that this outcome can also not be the
unique trembling-hand rationalizable one.
6. Conclusion
We have revisited n-player pure coordination games with Pareto-ranked
Nash equilibria. The novelties that we have introduced are fuzzy play and a
matching device. Each player does not choose which pure strategy to play,
but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to
the matching device. The matching device we have considered is a very simple
one. It only selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly some strategy
belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it does not
impose that the best alternatives are matched. We have applied the concepts
of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability to
the resulting situation. It has been shown that all players coordinate directly
on the Pareto optimal outcome. As a consequence, the players do neither use
the possibility of fuzzy play, nor do they use the matching device. Both
concepts lead to the conclusion that the mere possibility of fuzzy play and the
mere availability of a simple matching device is suﬃcient for direct coordi-
nation on the Pareto optimal outcome.
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